Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes – toward a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements

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In a widely read book published in 1960, the sociologist Daniel Bell proclaimed the "end of ideology." As the 1960s dawned, a good many social scientists believed we had reached a stage in the development of society where ideological conflict would gradually be replaced by a more pluralistic, pragmatic consensus. Bell and his colleagues could not have been more mistaken. In the very year Bell's book was published, black students staged sit-in demonstrations throughout the American South. In turn the sit-ins revitalized both a moribund civil rights movement and the tradition of leftist activism dormant in America since the 1930s. During the ensuing decade the country was rent by urban riots, massive antiwar demonstrations, student strikes, and political assassinations. On a global level, student movements proliferated: in France, Mexico, Italy, Germany, Spain, Japan, Pakistan, and numerous other countries. In Czechoslovakia, an effort to reform and "humanize the face of communism" was brutally suppressed by Soviet forces.

In short, the 1960s witnessed a proliferation in the very kinds of social movements and revolutions that Bell had assumed were a thing of the past. The last twenty-five years have only served to underscore the poverty of Bell's argument. If anything, social movements and revolutions have, in recent decades, emerged as a common – if not always welcome – feature of the political landscape. In the 1970s Islamic fundamentalists wrest power from the Shah of Iran. The Sandinistas depose Somoza in Nicaragua. Terrorist groups in Germany and Italy step up their attacks on military installations, politicians, and symbols of "corporate hegemony."

The 1980s were witness to more of the same. In the Philippines, the 1984 assassination of Ferdinand Marcos's longtime political rival, Benigno Aquino, sparks a popular revolt that sweeps Marcos from office. In the United States, growing fear of the nuclear threat catalyzes a nationwide Nuclear Freeze campaign. In South Africa a revitalized antiapartheid movement forces the release of its longtime leader, Nelson Mandela. The decade comes to a stunning and improbable end as, one after another, the Warsaw Pact regimes collapse under the pressure of popular revolts.

Set in motion by the turbulence of the 1960s and fueled by the myriad movements of the last quarter century, the study of social movements and revolutions has clearly emerged as one of the scholarly "growth industries" in the social sciences, in both Europe and the United States. Working from a variety of perspectives, sociologists, political scientists, and historians have produced over the past twenty years a wealth of theoretical and empirical scholarship on social movements/revolutions. It is time to take stock of this mushrooming literature. Within this profusion of work we think it is possible to discern the clear outlines of a synthetic, comparative perspective on social movements that transcends the limits of any single theoretical approach to the topic. This book rests on that perspective, even as it seeks to extend and apply it comparatively.

THE EMERGING SYNTHESIS

Increasingly one finds movement scholars from various countries and nominally representing different theoretical traditions emphasizing the importance of the same three broad sets of factors in analyzing the emergence and development of social movements/revolutions. These three factors are (1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement; (2) the forms of organization (informal as well as formal), available to insurgents; and (3) the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action. Or perhaps it will be easier to refer to these three factors by the conventional shorthand designations of *political opportunities, mobilizing structures,* and *framing processes.*

The emerging consensus among movement scholars regarding the importance of these three factors belies the very different and oftentimes antagonistic perspectives in which they developed. We begin by discussing each factor separately, with an eye to acknowledging the divergent intellectual streams that have influenced work on each.

Political opportunities

While it is now common for movement scholars to assert the importance of the broader political system in structuring the opportunities for collective action and the extent and form of same, the theoretical influences underpinning the insight are actually fairly recent. In the United States it was the work of such *political process* theorists as Charles Tilly (1978), Doug McAdam (1982), and Sidney Tarrow (1983) that firmly established the link between institutionalized politics and social movements/revolutions. Drawing on these works, a number of European (or European trained) scholars

schooled in the *new social movements* tradition brought a comparative dimension to the study of *political opportunity structures.* Among the Europeans who have explored the links between institutionalized and movement politics are Hanspeter Kriesi (1989), Herbert Kitschelt (1986), Ruud Koopmans (1992), and Jan Duyvendak (1992).

Though the work of all of these scholars betrays a common focus on the interaction of movement and institutionalized politics, this shared focus has nonetheless been motivated by a desire to answer two different research questions. Most of the early work by American scholars sought to explain the *emergence* of a particular social movement on the basis of *changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system.* More recently, European scholars have sought to account for *cross-national differences in the structure, extent, and success of comparable movements* on the basis of *differences in the political characteristics of the nation states in which they are embedded.* The first approach has tended to produce detailed historical case studies of single movements or protest cycles (i.e., McAdam, 1982; Costain, 1992; Tarrow, 1989a), while the second has inspired more cross-national research based on contemporaneous descriptions of the same movement in a number of different national contexts (i.e., Kriesi et al., 1992; Joppke, 1991; Ferree, 1987). In both cases, however, the researcher is guided by the same underlying conviction: that social movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded.

Mobilizing structures

If institutionalized political systems shape the prospects for collective action and the forms movements take, their influence is not independent of the various kinds of *mobilizing structures* through which groups seek to organize. By mobilizing structures we mean *those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action.* This focus on the meso-level groups, organizations, and informal networks that comprise the collective building blocks of social movements and revolutions constitutes the second conceptual element in our synthesis of recent work in the field.

As was the case with the work on political opportunities, the recent spate of research and theorizing on the organizational dynamics of collective action has drawn its inspiration largely from two distinct theoretical perspectives. The most important of these has been resource mobilization theory. As formulated by its initial proponents (McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977), resource mobilization sought to break with grievance-based conceptions of social movements and to focus instead on *mobilization processes* and the formal organizational manifestations of these processes. For McCarthy and Zald

social movements, while perhaps not synonymous with formal organizations, were nonetheless known by and became a force for social change primarily through the social movement organizations (SMOs) they spawned. In some ways, theirs was less a theory about the emergence or development of social movements than it was an attempt to describe and map a new social movement form – professional social movements – that they saw as increasingly dominant in contemporary America.

The second theoretical tradition to encourage work on the organizational dynamics of collective action has been the political process model. Indeed, one of the characteristics by which scholars in this tradition are known is their common dissent from the resource mobilization equation of social movements with formal organization. Charles Tilly and various of his colleagues (1975, 1978) laid the theoretical foundation for this second approach by documenting the critical role of various grassroots settings – work and neighborhood, in particular – in facilitating and structuring collective action. Drawing on Tilly's work, other scholars sought to apply his insights to more contemporary movements. For example, Aldon Morris (1981, 1984) and Doug McAdam (1982) analyzed the critical role played by local black institutions – principally churches and colleges – in the emergence of the American civil rights movement. Similarly, Sara Evans's (1980) research clearly located the origins of the women's liberation movement within informal friendship networks which were forged by women who were active in the civil rights movement and in the American New Left. Even the more recent tradition of network studies of movement recruitment (Gould, 1991; Kriesi, 1988; McAdam, 1986; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson, 1980) would seem to betray an underlying theoretical affinity with the political process model's emphasis on informal, grassroots mobilizing structures.

While some proponents of these approaches initially treated the two models of movement organization as mutually exclusive, over time the profusion of empirical work inspired by both has led to a growing awareness among movement scholars of the diversity of collective settings in which movements develop and organizational forms to which they give rise. So instead of debating the relative merits of these "opposing" characterizations, movement scholars have increasingly turned their attention to other research agendas concerning the organizational dynamics of social movements. Among the more interesting of these agendas are (1) comparison of the "organizational infrastructures" of countries both to understand historic patterns of mobilization better and to predict where future movements are likely to arise, (2) specification of the relationship between organizational form and type of movement, and (3) assessment of the effect of both state structures and national "organizational cultures" on the form that movements take in a given country.

Framing processes

If the combination of political opportunities and mobilizing structures affords groups a certain structural potential for action, they remain, in the absence of one other factor, insufficient to account for collective action. Mediating between opportunity, organization, and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation. At a minimum people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem. Lacking either one or both of these perceptions, it is highly unlikely that people will mobilize even when afforded the opportunity to do so. Conditioning the presence or absence of these perceptions is that complex of social psychological dynamics – collective attribution, social construction – that David Snow and various of his colleagues (Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988) have referred to as *framing processes.* Indeed, not only did Snow coin, or more accurately, modify and apply Erving Goffman's term, to the study of social movements, but in doing so helped to crystallize and articulate a growing discontent among movement scholars over how little significance proponents of the resource mobilization perspective attached to ideas and sentiments. In reasserting their importance, Snow and his colleagues drew not only on Goffman's work, but ironically on the collective behavior tradition which resource mobilization had sought to supplant as the dominant paradigm in the field. Within that older tradition, both Smelser (1962) and Turner and Killian (1987) had assigned to ideas a prominent place in their respective theories.

But Snow was not alone in asserting the importance of the more cognitive, or ideational dimensions of collective action. Two other streams of recent work have also called for further attention to the role of ideas or culture more generally in the emergence and development of social movements and revolutions. For many of the new social movement scholars it was the centrality of their cultural elements that marked the new social movements as discontinuous with the past. Small wonder then that the work of many of the most influential new social movements theorists focused primarily on the sources and functions of meaning and identity within social movements (Brand, 1985a, 1982; Inglehart, 1979, 1977; Melucci, 1988, 1985, 1980; Touraine, 1981).

The final theoretical perspective to emphasize the importance of shared and socially constructed ideas in collective action was the political process model. Though best known for their stress on the political structuring of social movements/revolutions, such theorists as Gamson (1992a), Tarrow (1989a, 1983), and Tilly (1978) also acknowledged the critical catalytic effect of new ideas as a spur to collective action. McAdam's (1982) discussion of the necessity for "cognitive liberation" as a prerequisite for mobilization is

only the most explicit acknowledgment of the importance of ideas within the political process tradition.

For all the convergence in these various theoretical perspectives little systematic work on framing processes (or the cultural dimensions of social movements) has yet been produced. To this point, the literature is long on ringing programmatic statements regarding the necessity for "bringing culture back in," but short on the kind of cumulative scholarship that we now have on the role of political opportunities or mobilizing structures in the emergence and development of movements. In part this lacunae may be a consequence of the ephemeral, amorphous nature of the subject matter. Studying political systems and various kinds of organization is inherently easier than trying to observe the social construction and dissemination of new ideas.

But it may also be that a lack of conceptual precision in defining what we mean by "framing processes" has handicapped efforts to study this important aspect of collective action. Though Snow and his colleagues meant something quite specific by their use of the term, recent writings have tended to equate the concept with any and all cultural dimensions of social movements. This usage threatens to rob the concept of its coherence and therefore its theoretical utility. In this volume we want to return to David Snow's original conception and define framing rather narrowly as referring to the *conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.*

In undertaking this volume, we were guided by four aims. First, we wanted to abstract from the voluminous literature on social movements those three concepts that have emerged as the central analytic foci of most scholarship in the area. Second, by taking their theoretical measure we hoped to refine and sharpen our understanding of each of these concepts. We take up this second goal in the essays with which we introduce each of the book's three parts. Each essay focuses on one of the three concepts, sketching our current understanding of it, the limits of that conceptualization, and the modifications or conceptual refinements that might redress the limitations.

That leaves the third and fourth goals alluded to earlier. The third goal is to advance our understanding of the dynamic *relations* among opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. Whereas most scholarship has focused on one or another of these factors, we use this volume to sketch a broader analytic framework on social movements/revolutions that combines the insights gained from the study of all three factors. Finally, we wanted to explore the comparative uses of this emerging framework by discussing the concepts of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes in cross-national perspective. In commissioning the chapters for this volume we sought to directly address these final two goals. Each author was

asked to focus on the relationship between any two of our three concepts and, wherever possible, to do so in a way that furthered the comparative understanding of movement dynamics. But we would be remiss if we relied on the contributors alone to advance the final two goals of the volume. Accordingly, in the remaining two sections of this introductory essay, we will take up each of these topics in turn. We begin with some thoughts on the dynamic relationships among our three concepts.

LINKING OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND FRAMING PROCESSES

Scholars have tended to study only one aspect of a movement – for example, the effect of expanding political opportunities or the organizational dynamics of collective action. The challenge, of course, is to sketch the relationships between these factors, thus yielding a fuller understanding of social movement dynamics.

The problem is there exist many relationships between our three factors. Which ones become relevant depends upon the research question of interest. We emphasize two such questions here. The first concerns the origins of social movements and revolutions; the second, the extent and form of the movement over time. In each case we are interested in understanding the factors and processes that shape the movement: its emergence on the one hand, and it ongoing development on the other.

The question of movement emergence

Understanding the mix of factors that give rise to a movement is the oldest, and arguably the most important, question in the field. Moreover, virtually all "theories" in the field are, first and foremost, theories of movement emergence. That includes the various perspectives touched on earlier. Proponents of collective behavior see strain, variably conceived, and the shared ideas it gives rise to, as the root cause of social movements. Though there is great diversity among those working in the new social movements tradition, most proponents of the perspective betray adherence to at least a broadly similar account of the movement emergence. That account highlights the role of the distinctive material and ideological contradictions in postmaterial society in helping to mobilize new political constituencies around either nonmaterial or previously private issues. Resource-mobilization theorists focus on the critical role of resources and formal organization in the rise of movements. The political process model stresses the crucial importance of expanding political opportunities as the ultimate spur to collective action.

In our view all of these theories have something to recommend them. Our starting point, however, reflects the underlying assumption of the political

process model. We share with proponents of that perspective the conviction that most political movements and revolutions are set in motion by social changes that render the established political order more vulnerable or receptive to challenge. But these "political opportunities" are but a necessary prerequisite to action. In the absence of sufficient organization – whether formal or informal – such opportunities are not likely to be seized. Finally, mediating between the structural requirements of opportunity and organization are the emergent meanings and definitions – or frames – shared by the adherents of the burgeoning movement. As both collective behavior and new social movements theorists have long argued, the impetus to action is as much a cultural construction as it is a function of structural vulnerability.

Having stressed the significance of all three of our factors, it is important to add that their effects are interactive rather than independent. No matter how momentous a change appears in retrospect, it only becomes an "opportunity" when defined as such by a *group* of actors sufficiently well organized to act on this shared definition of the situation. Implicit in this description of the beginnings of collective action are two critically important interactive relationships. The first concerns the relationship between framing processes and the kinds of "objective" political changes thought to facilitate movement emergence. The point is, such changes encourage mobilization not only through the "objective" effects they have on power relations, but by setting in motion framing processes that further undermine the legitimacy of the system or its perceived mutability. So, it is pointless to ask whether Gorbachev's reforms encouraged the revolutions in Eastern Europe by changing the political structure of the former Warsaw Pact countries or by heightening people's subjective awareness of the system's illegitimacy and vulnerability. Clearly they had both effects. Gorbachev's stated unwillingness to intervene militarily in defense of the Warsaw Pact countries encouraged collective action both by objectively weakening the social control forces available to those regimes and by heightening public perception of their illegitimacy and vulnerability. Expanding political opportunities, then, derive their causal force from the interaction of those structural and perceptual changes they set in motion.

A similar reciprocal dynamic defines the relationship between organization and framing processes. Framing processes clearly encourage mobilization, as people seek to organize and act on their growing awareness of the system's illegitimacy and vulnerability. At the same time, the potential for the kind of system critical framing processes we have described here, is, we believe, conditioned by the population's access to various mobilizing structures. As Murray Edelman (1971: 32) has written, the perceptual roots of collective action are bound up with the "cuings among groups of people who jointly create the meanings they will read into current and anticipated events."

For us, the key phrase in the preceding sentence is "groups of people."

That is, framing processes are held to be both more likely and of far greater consequence under conditions of strong rather than weak organization. The latter point should be intuitively apparent. Even in the unlikely event that system-critical framings were to emerge in the context of little or no organization, the absence of any real mobilizing structure would almost surely prevent their spread to the minimum number of people required to afford a basis for collective action. More to the point, however, is the suspicion that lacking organization these framings would never emerge in the first place.

This suspicion rests, in part, on the supposition that what Ross (1977) calls the "fundamental attribution error" – that is, the tendency of people to explain their situation as a function of individual deficiencies rather than features of the system – is more likely to occur under conditions of social isolation rather than organization. Lacking the information and perspective that others afford, isolated individuals would seem especially likely to explain their troubles on the basis of personal rather than system attributions. Only "system attributions" afford the necessary rationale for movement activity. For movement analysts, then, the key question becomes, What social circumstances are productive of system critical framing processes and the system attributions they yield? Following Ferree and Miller (1977: 34) the answer would appear to be: "among homogenous people who are in intense regular contact with each other." Their description speaks to the essence of what we have called mobilizing structures.

Besides defining the broad parameters of a model of movement emergence, our three factors can also be used to shed light on a second question concerning the beginnings of collective action. This is the critically important, yet woefully neglected, question of movement form. That is, under what conditions can we expect a given type of movement (e.g., grassroots reform movement, public interest lobby, revolution) to emerge? The important implication of the question is that the various types of movements are simply different forms of collective action rather than qualitatively different phenomena requiring distinct explanatory theories. This is most germane to the study of revolutions, a form of collective action that has, in recent years, come to be studied as a phenomenon distinct from other categories of movements. We demur. Rather than assuming difference, we need to treat movement type as a variable and seek to account for variation in type on the basis of particular combinations of opportunities, mobilizing structures, and collective action frames.

Space constraints and the complexity of the issue do not permit a full-blown theory of movement type, but we can at least sketch our preliminary thinking on the topic and, in the process, illustrate the utility of our basic perspective for addressing this important question. Not surprisingly, we start by again stressing the central importance of political opportunities to an understanding of movement dynamics.

In our introduction to the "political opportunities" part of this volume, we take up an issue that has begun to be addressed by scholars in the political process and new social movements traditions. Concerned that the concept of political opportunities lacks conceptual precision, scholars such as Hanspeter Kriesi (1991) and Sidney Tarrow (1994: chap. 8) have sought to identify those specific dimensions of political systems that impact the structuring of collective action. We applaud these efforts and in the introduction to Part I offer our own schema for differentiating the relevant dimensions of "political opportunity structures." We leave the details of that scheme till then. For our present purposes, however, we need to at least list these dimensions. They are as follows:

1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system
2. The stability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity
3. The presence of elite allies
4. The state's capacity and propensity for repression

So, for example, scholars seeking to explain the emergence of collective action would be advised to analyze the ways in which *changes* in one (or more) of these dimensions rendered the political system more receptive or vulnerable to challenge by insurgent groups. But, apropos of our present discussion, it may be that the *form,* as much as the *timing,* of collective action is structured by the available political opportunity. That is, a change in any of the four dimensions may encourage mobilization, but the form the mobilization takes is very likely to be affected by the kind of opportunity presented.

In Chapter 5 of this volume, Elena Zdravomyslova provides two examples that nicely illustrate the argument, contrasting two movement groups that developed in Leningrad/St. Petersburg in the wake of Gorbachev's reforms. The first, the Democratic Union, was founded in 1988, largely in response to the Gorbachev-inspired thaw in public discourse and the attendant *relaxation of social control* by state authorities. In turn, in its form and practices, the Democratic Union clearly bore the imprint of these specific changes or opportunities. The group was oriented, almost exclusively, to disruptive public demonstrations aimed at exploiting and extending the state's more tolerant policy on public gatherings and political demonstrations.

In contrast, the second group Zdravomyslova analyzes, the Leningrad People's Front, emerged following passage of the Electoral Law of 1988. That law mandated popular elections to be held the following year, thus granting insurgents *new electoral access.* Consistent with the nature and "location" of the opportunity granted, the Leningrad People's Front mounted a broad-based *electoral campaign.*

In short, insurgents can be expected to mobilize in response to and in a manner consistent with the very specific changes that grant them more leverage. In the case of Zdravomyslova's two groups, insurgents were oriented to

lizing structures in which insurgents are embedded on the eve of the movement.

The question of movement development and outcomes

Having used our three factors to analyze the timing and form of movement emergence, we turn our attention to the later stages of collective action. What can a perspective stressing the role of opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes tell us about the dynamics of movement development? A great deal, we think. Indeed, we see a lot of continuity between the processes shaping movement emergence and those influencing the ongoing development and eventual decline of collective action. The similarities and differences between these two phases of collective action should become clearer as we discuss each of the three factors.

Political opportunities. Little needs to be added to our earlier discussion of this factor. Suffice it to say, the broad political environment in which the movement is embedded will continue to constitute a powerful set of constraints/opportunities affecting the latter's development. So, for example, cross-national differences in the more stable, institutional features of political systems should have significant effects on the trajectories of particular movements. For instance, the stark contrast between the American winner-take-all electoral system and West Germany's partially proportional system of representation probably accounts for the very different developmental histories of the American and West German environmental movements. While the restrictive structure of electoral politics in the United States foreclosed that as a viable developmental option for American environmentalists, the opposite was true in West Germany. Though no less "radical" than their American counterparts, the West German Greens found the ease of electoral access too alluring to pass up. As a consequence the West German – and now, German – environmental movement has long had a more electoral or institutional character than its American counterpart.

Besides helping to account for cross-national differences in the development of comparable movements, a focus on *changes* in the structure of political opportunities can contribute to our understanding of the shifting fortunes of a single movement. In accounting for the decline of the American civil rights movement one would want to mention a number of factors. But among the most important would have to be the redemocratization of voting rights in the South, the development of significant Republican strength in the region, and Nixon's recognition and exploitation of this development in his successful 1968 presidential campaign. The success of Nixon's "Southern strategy" in 1968 dealt a serious blow to the black struggle, by forcefully demonstrating the irrelevance of the "black vote" to Republican Party for-

a relaxation in social control and the granting of electoral access respectively. But the same argument holds for the other two dimensions of political opportunities as well. The routine electoral transfer of institutional power from one group of incumbents to another can be expected to encourage the creation (or reactivation) of reform movements who interpret the transfer of power as granting them new elite allies. So, just as movements on the Left mobilized in the United States during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, so too did the Reagan/Bush years see a marked increase in protest activity on the Right.

Finally, the broadest reform and revolutionary movements would seem to owe, not to the routine circulation of stable elite blocs but to those momentous, if rare, cleavages in previously stable governing alliances. So, the American civil rights movement recognized and successfully exploited the growing rift between two important partners in the New Deal Coalition: Southern Dixiecrats and Northern "labor liberals." As regards revolutions, virtually every major theorist of the form has stressed the critical importance of elite cleavages as a central impetus to mobilization (Goldstone, 1991; Skocpol, 1979).

The important implication in all this is that in both their timing and form social movements bear the imprint of the specific opportunities that give them life. But what was true of timing is no less the case with form; that mobilizing structures and framing processes mediate the effects of political opportunities. Once again, the American civil rights movement affords a nice example of these processes. The breadth and scope of the movement owed, first and foremost, to the significance of the political realignments and elite divisions that presaged it. At the same time, nothing about the type or "location" of this opportunity can account for the specific organizational form or ideological content of the movement. To understand that one must look to the particular mobilizing structures within which the movement emerged and to the framing processes that characterized the movement at the outset. Clearly these two factors are related. In the case of the civil rights movement, initial mobilization centered largely in the black church (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984). Given the church's institutional centrality in the early days of the struggle, it is hardly surprising that the initial "framings" coming out of the movement had a distinctly religious cast to them. On the contrary, the influence of this particular mobilizing structure was evident in any number of specific organizational features of the movement, from reliance on the mass meeting as a mobilizing device, to the disproportionate number of ministers in the ranks of early movement leaders.

Thus, type of opportunity may dictate the broad category of movement, but the formal and ideological properties of the movement are apt to be more directly influenced by the organizational forms and ideological templates available to insurgents. And these, in turn, are largely a product of the mobi-

lizing structures in which insurgents are embedded on the eve of the movement.

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tunes, thereby granting the movement little leverage over Nixon or any of his Republican successors.

So the structure of political opportunities, as defined by both the enduring and volatile features of a given political system, can be expected to continue to play a major role in shaping the ongoing fortunes of the movement. What is different from the emergent phase is the fact that, after the onset of protest activity, the broader set of environmental opportunities and constraints are no longer independent of the actions of movement groups. The structure of political opportunities is now more a product of the interaction of the movement with its environment than a simple reflection of changes occurring elsewhere. Thus to understand fully the impact of the environment on the developing movement we will need to look much more closely at the movement itself and specifically those of its features which appear to account for much of its capacity to reshape the broader political landscape.

The organizational structure of the movement

The relevant organizational question in regard to movement emergence is whether insurgents have available to them "mobilizing structures" of sufficient strength to get the movement off the ground. However, once collective action is underway, the nature of the organizational challenge confronting the movement changes significantly. It is no longer the simple availability of mobilizing structures, but the organizational profile of those groups purporting to represent the movement that becomes important. The nature of these groups is apt to change a great deal as well. While movements often develop within established institutions or informal associational networks, it is rare that they remain embedded in these *nonmovement* settings. For the movement to survive, insurgents must be able to create a more enduring organizational structure to sustain collective action. Efforts to do so usually entail the creation of the kinds of formal social movement organizations (SMOs) stressed as important by resource-mobilization theorists. Following the emergent phase of the movement, then, it is these SMOs and their efforts to shape the broader political environment which influence the overall pace and outcome of the struggle. In turn, the empirical literature would seem to suggest that the success or failure of these efforts owes primarily to some combination of three organizational factors.

Disruptive tactics. Notwithstanding the pluralist's claim that political effectiveness depends on tactical restraint and respect for "proper channels," there is increasing empirical evidence to the contrary. McAdam (1983b) found that the pace and effectiveness of civil rights protest was largely a function of the movement's ability to devise innovative and disruptive tactics that temporarily broke the stalemate between civil rights forces and their segregationist

opponents. Lacking sufficient power to defeat Southern segregationists in a local confrontation, insurgents sought, through use of new and provocative tactics – the sit-ins, freedom rides, the Freedom Summer project – to induce their opponents to disrupt public order to the point where supportive federal intervention was required.

In his study of fifty-four "challenging groups," William Gamson (1990) reports evidence consistent with the single case study cited above. Gamson finds that groups which used "force and violence" against their opponents tended to be "more successful" than groups that did not. These findings are not so counterintuitive as one might think. The successful use of "proper channels" would seem to depend upon control over precisely the kinds of conventional political resources – money, votes, influence with prominent others – that movement groups tend to lack. Lacking such resources, movements may have little choice but to use their ability to disrupt public order as a negative inducement to bargaining.

Finally, in his seminal synthesis of recent movement scholarship, Tarrow (1994) argues persuasively that it is disruption or the threat of same that grants to movements their improbable effectiveness as vehicles of social change.

"Radical flank effects." Besides the narrow function of disruptive tactics, movements would, in general, appear to benefit from the presence of a "radical" wing. Or, more precisely, movements that boast a number of groups spanning a wide tactical spectrum seem to benefit from what has come to be known as the "radical flank effect" (Barkan, 1979; Haines, 1988). The term is used to describe one effect that often follows from the presence of "extremist" groups within the same movement with other more "moderate" SMOs. As Haines (1988) shows in his analysis of changes in the funding of the major civil rights organizations, such a situation is likely to redound to the benefit of the moderate SMOs. In effect, the presence of extremists encourages funding support for the moderates as a way of undercutting the influence of the radicals.

A similar dynamic may also characterize relations between the state and the movement. In the modern era, the demands of most movements are ultimately adjudicated by representatives of the state. To respond to a movement, state actors must focus on those movement leaders and organizations that seem to speak for the movement and yet who are perceived to be reliable negotiating partners. In such a situation, the presence of groups deemed extremist can actually help legitimate and strengthen the bargaining hand of more moderate SMOs. Ironically, pressure from the extremists may simultaneously push the moderates to adopt more radical positions themselves. The end result is often state support for legislative or policy changes once deemed far too radical, by both moderates and the state alike.

Goals. In their efforts to interact successfully with the broader political and organizational environment, SMOs rely heavily on their goals. That is, the reactions of other major parties to the conflict – the state, countermovement, the media, and so on – are shaped to a considerable degree by the group's stated goals. Encoded in those goals are perceived threats to the interests of some groups and opportunities for the realization of others. Thus, the mix of opposition and support enjoyed by a given SMO is conditioned by the perception of threat and opportunity embodied in the group's goals. Given this dynamic, another finding from Gamson's study of "challenging groups" makes intuitive sense. He found that groups whose goals required the "displacement" of their opponents were much less likely to be successful than those whose objectives were "non-displacing" (Gamson, 1990: 41–44).

We close our discussion of the effect of goals on movement development by noting one additional finding from Gamson's study. Besides the substance of group goals, Gamson also looked at the sheer number of objectives pursued. Specifically, he distinguished groups based on their pursuit of "single" versus "multiple" goals. At first blush, there might appear to be a virtue in the second approach, promising as it does to draw more people into the movement based on its diverse set of goals. Then too a single-issue organization that succeeds in achieving its goal faces extinction. Not so with a group pursuing many goals.

On reflection, however, it seems clear that there are a number of dangers with the multiple-goal strategy as well. The pursuit of a number of goals promises to spread thin the already precious resources and energy of the SMO. Just as dangerous is the impetus to internal dissension and factionalism that may accompany the pursuit of multiple goals. Who gets to decide which goals will be accorded top priority and what resources will be expended for which purposes? If a group settles on a single goal, it immediately eliminates potentially divisive issues such as these. Consistent with this latter view, Gamson finds single-issue groups to be successful more often than those addressing multiple goals (Gamson, 1990: 44–46).

Our point in surveying the literature on these three factors was not to get us bogged down in the empirical details of movement studies. Rather it was to underscore the central point of our discussion of movement development: *Movements may largely be born of environmental opportunities, but their fate is heavily shaped by their own actions.* Specifically, it is the formal organizations who purport to speak for the movement, who increasingly dictate the course, content, and outcomes of the struggle. In terms of our three factors, this means that both political opportunities and framing processes are more the product of organizational dynamics than they were during the emergent phase of the movement. We have already said a good bit about the role of political opportunities in the later stages of collective action. We close this